Comments

Guest Post: Standing and Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Ohio Foreclosure Actions: A Third Way? — 7 Comments

  1. I think this is a really strange decision, and this distinction between “subject-matter jurisdiction” and “jurisdiction over the particular case” seems beyond strained.

    The Supreme Court briefly discussed void judgments and voidable judgments, but so far as I can tell this issue wasn’t really briefed by the parties below. The motion for relief from judgment was based on (and the Supreme Court cites only) Rule 60(B)(3)–the homeowners had argued that the plaintiff engaged in fraud by filing the case when it didn’t own the note and mortgage. I wonder if they might have had more success arguing 60(B)(4), which provides for relief if the judgment is void. Maybe not, but I also wouldn’t be surprised to see someone try to produce a different result through that subdivision.

    • If you look at prior case law on the definition of subject matter jurisdiction (Morrison v. Steiner, for instance) the distinction is more than confusing.

      As for using a different provision of 60(B), I don’t think it would work. The Court’s reasoning was fragmented on this point. At one point, it discussed only 60(B)(3). At another, it didn’t seem to limit its decision to that provision. It did, however, cover the void/voidable distinction. It did so to make it clear that the lack of standing does not void a judgment because it does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, a common law motion is not available. It then held that a lack of standing is not a basis for relief under Rule 60(B). It could, however, theoretically provide the meritorious defense should another basis for relief be present.

  2. I have often thought that the analysis in Pratts v. Hurley was misguided. To me, the idea of the “wrongful exercise of jurisdiction” is nothing more than a fancy label for judicial error. I’ve thought that the primary consideration should focus on the nature of the statutory requirement at issue. Is the three-judge requirement a restriction on the power of the court to proceed in capital cases, or is it a procedural safeguard designed solely for the benefit of the accused? The former would deprive the court of the legislative grant of power to act. The latter would be a personal right subject to waiver.

    Moreover, a close reading of Pratts reveals a critical distinction with the situation presented in Kuchta. At paragraph 13 of Pratts, the court cites to Art. IV, sec. 4(B) of Ohio’s Constitution and notes that there was no assertion that the criminal case was not properly filed in the common pleas court. To me, that language indicates that the common pleas court’s jurisdiction was properly invoked through the commencement of the case. The same cannot be said in Kuchta.

    A court can certainly exercise its jurisdiction improperly, but to call that a form of jurisdiction needlessly complicates the issue. It is what it is – an error subject to correction on appeal.

  3. The legal and linguistic gymnastics some courts are engaging in continues to amaze me. Some of this stuff just isn’t that hard to understand. The issue of standing is among the easy ones.

    Ohio has an “open courts doctrine” expressed in § 16 of the Ohio Constitution, which states:

    All courts shall be open, and every
    person, for an injury done him in his
    land, goods, person, or reputation, shall
    have remedy by due course of law, and
    shall have justice administered without
    denial or delay.

    The words are precise, and limited: if you’ve been injured we (the courts) will help you obtain remedy. Because the words are precise, and limited, anything else is excluded (expressio unius exclusio altatius). If you haven’t been injured the courts will not help you. This is sensible.

    Consider this alternative: My neighbor has not injured me in my land, goods, person, or reputation, but I want to sue him for $5000 for injuries I have not sustained, and I want you (the courts) to help me obtain those monies.

    Arguing anything outside of the clearly expressed meanings of § 16 is meritless.

    • The provision you quote is in Ohio’s Bill of Rights and is read so ensure the people’s access to the courts for redress. It both preserves the right and prevents Ohio’s government from infringing on the right.

      The constitutional provision at issue in Schwartzwald and Kuchta is Art. IV, sec. 4(B), which creates common pleas courts and defines their power.

      Nonetheless, the Open Courts provision does not suggest that those without injury have a right to access the courts.

  4. The Ohio Constitution provides in Article IV, Section 4(B): “The courts of common pleas and divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and agencies as may be provided by law”. The SCO ruled in Schwartzwald that standing must be determined at the time a suit is commenced, the court holds that a plaintiff without an interest in a note or mortgage at the time it filed a foreclosure action did not cure the lack of standing by subsequently obtaining an interest in the subject of the litigation.

    In Kuchta, there has never been a “justiciable matter” before the court.

    What we see here is the courts trying to make sense out of nonsense. Perhaps that is why the the scholars call the the GSE Business Model “fatally flawed”. That same business model has hijacked the mortgage industry over the past 20 years and no one wants to face that fact. Trying to create a dispensation for banks lacking standing against foreclosure victims has dire consequences.

  5. I would hope that Ohio courts (an elsewhere) would come to realize that to divorce words from their original meanings, you end up in an endless loop of doublespeak.